This blog post contains excerpts from an article written by Frank S. Murray, Jr. For the full article, please follow the link below.
United States: A White Paper Regarding Department Of Defense Implementation Of Section 818 Of The National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2012
According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, "No type of company or organization has been untouched by counterfeit electronic parts. Even the most reliable of parts sources have discovered counterfeit parts within their inventories."
A United States Senate Armed Services Committee's ("SASC") investigation concluded that "unvetted independent distributors are the source of the overwhelming majority of suspect parts in the defense supply chain. ...As a result of the two-year SASC investigation, the SASC's Report announced eight key conclusions:
Conclusion 1: China is the dominant source country for counterfeit electronics parts that are infiltrating the defense supply chain.
Flea Market Note: Most counterfeits in every consumer category that we encounter are from China.
Conclusion 2: The Chinese government has failed to take steps to stop counterfeiting operations that are carried out openly in that country.
Flea Market Note: The counterfeit products are shipped to the US, pass through customs and ultimately end up at independently owned stores, kiosks and flea markets.
Conclusion 3: The Department of Defense lacks knowledge of the scope and impact of counterfeit parts on critical defense systems.
Flea Market Note: To grow our knowledge, we must conduct ongoing research regarding brands, sources, laws, retail and wholesale merchandise differences, consultation with experts.
Conclusion 4: The use of counterfeit electronic parts in defense systems can compromise performance and reliability, risk national security, and endanger the safety of military personnel.
Flea Market Note: Most counterfeit products are cheap, defective, fragile and other-wise short-lived in their usability. Ultimately a waste of the consumer's money.
Conclusion 5: Permitting contractors to recover costs incurred as a result of their own failure to detect counterfeit electronic parts does not encourage the adoption of aggressive counterfeit avoidance and detection programs.
Flea Market Note: We just keep plugging along to learn how to detect counterfeits of all types and quality levels.
Conclusion 6: The defense industry's reliance on unvetted independent distributors to supply electronics parts for critical military applications results in unacceptable risks to national security and the safety of U.S. military personnel.
Flea Market Note: Independent merchandise distributors are local independently owned stores and online and brick and mortar wholesalers who sell a combination of real and counterfeit products.
Conclusion 7: Weaknesses in the testing regime for electronic parts create vulnerabilities that are exploited by counterfeits.
Flea Market Note: Our testing regime includes gathering a "database collection" of both real and counterfeit products and comparing the similarities and differences. We visit and consult at retail stores, websites and other secret locations in order to get the "whole story" about a particular suspicious item. Sometimes it is a "quick tell", sometimes it takes more involved detective work.
Conclusion 8: The defense industry routinely failed to report cases of suspect counterfeit parts, putting the integrity of the defense supply chain at risk.
Flea Market Note: To maintain our integrity as a family-friendly venue for small business entrepreneurs, we adhere to a strict Anti-Counterfeit Policy.
To read more about Wolff's Flea Market's counterfeit policy, go to wolffs.com
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